Linear price systems, typically used to model "perfect" markets, are widely known not to accommodate most of the typical frictions featured in "actual" ones. Since some years, "proportional" frictions (taxes, bid-ask spreads, and so on) are modeled by means of sublinear price functionals, which proved to give a more "realistic" description. In this paper, we want to introduce two more classes of functionals, not yet widely used in Mathematical Finance, which provide a further improvement and an even closer adherence to actual markets, namely the class of granular functionals, obtained when the unit prices of traded assets are increasing w.r.t. the traded amount; and the class of star-shaped functionals, obtained when the average unit prices of traded assets are increasing w.r.t. the traded amount. A characterisation of such functionals, together with their relationships with arbitrages and other (more significant) market inefficiencies, is explored.
Introduction
One of the first and biggest concerns of Mathematical Finance is to study the prices of a suitable set of risky financial assets of any type, including stocks, indexed bonds, variable rate deposits, derivative securities, and so on. Usually, financial assets are modeled as random variables on some state sets, which are supposed to be the same for every asset in the considered market.
In earlier models, such as the one leading to the celebrated Black, Scholes, and Merton formula for option pricing (Black & Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973) , the market is supposed to be a perfect one; in particular, no frictions are featured and no bid-ask spreads or commissions affect prices. Consequently, as it is clearly shown, for instance, in Dothan (1990) , Pliska (1997) , and Björk (1999) , asset prices turn out to be linear with respect to assets themselves, in the sense that the price of the sum of two positions exactly equals the sum of the two sepa-rated prices. In such a setting, a central result is found, called the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, of which dozens of variants are featured in the literature (besides the cited books see, for instance, Delbaen & Schachermayer, 1994 , for quite a general version), which essentially is a representation theorem: roughly speaking, the market prices do not allow for arbitrages (i.e., free gains without risks) if and only if there exist a probability measure called the risk neutral probability-and a discount factor such that prices themselves are (discounted) expected values of the future asset values.
The perfect market model, however, quickly proves to be unfit to provide a good description of realistic markets. For instance, it may be impossible to obtain the exact replication of a given pay-off, and therefore no linear price can be given for it. In such a case, as investigated by Davis & Clark (1994) , the investor may naturally aim at super-hedging it, i.e., at getting at least as much as needed (possibly more) at the minimum possible price. There are also cases when, due to market frictions, a dynamical strategy that exactly replicates the given pay-off may turn out to be more expensive than a super-hedging one: see, e.g., Hodges & Neuberger (1989) . El Karoui & Quenez (1995) , Jouini & Kallal (1995) , Jouini (1997) , and Cvitanić et al. (1999) among others, had investigated such a setting and found a representation theorem: in any case, super-hedging prices turn out to be the maximum of a family of linear prices, which, for instance, Cvitanić et al. (1999) interpreted as prices in "shadow markets". Moreover, Pham (2000) studied the properties of super-hedging price functionals to find them sublinear: additivity was replaced by subadditivity, meaning that the price of the sum of two positions might be cheaper than the sum of the two separated prices. Since sublinearity entails positive homogeneity besides subadditivity, it turns out to be perfectly fit to describe markets affected by proportional transaction costs (such as taxes or percentage commissions): see, e.g., . Furthermore, sublinearity turned out to be interesting for risk management purposes as well, being the foundational point for the celebrated paper by Artzner et al. (1999) on coherent risk measures.
A class of risk measures more general than the sublinear (i.e., coherent) ones of Artzner et al. (1999) is proposed by Föllmer & Schied (2002) , who replace sublinearity with the weaker convexity 1 . Inspired by their work, we started wondering whether convex price functions may sensibly be adapted to financial markets: we realized that this was naturally the case, for instance, if unit asset prices are supposed to increase with respect to the traded amount. A representation result can be found, stating that convex price functionals are the upper envelope of a family of affine prices, which admit an interpretation similar to the "shadow markets" of Cvitanić et al. (1999) .
Another, further generalisation, may require average unit asset prices to be increasing, instead of "marginal" ones. This may be the case, for instance, when an agent can choose to buy an asset on several different markets, featuring different increasing unit prices: of course, the purchase will be conducted in such a way that the overall price (or, which is the same, the average unit price) is as low as possible. This leads to a totally new class of price functions, which we name star-shaped because their epigraph turns out to be a star-shaped set with respect to the origin, in the sense of Stewart & Tall (1983) . A representation result can be given for this class of functionals as well, with an interesting economical interpretation.
In the remaining part of this section, the notation used throughout the entire paper is stated, and the current state of the literature about linear and sublinear prices is briefly summarized. Although in different notation, everything exposed here can be found, for instance, in Dothan (1990) , Pliska (1997) , and Björk (1999) for the linear setting, and in Jouini & Kallal (1995) and Koehl & Pham (2000) for the sublinear case. Some examples, in a simple discrete setting, are also given, in order to allow the reader for familiarising with the phenomena under study. Remarkably, we emphasise that, as soon as the price functional is no longer linear, market efficiency is no longer guaranteed by absence of arbitrages only, and that another class of inefficiencies, namely the convenient super-hedgings (roughly speaking, the opportunity to get a better pay-off at a lower price), have to be taken into account.
Section 2 is dedicated to introducing and examining the convex case. After observing that convex functions naturally pop out when pricing by super-hedging by means of assets whose unit price is increasing, we give a generalisation of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, and give an interpretation of the representation in 1 Further generalisations of convex risk measures have been proposed. El Karoui & Ravanelli (2009) remarked that cash additivity, which was a required property of coherent risk measures, should be replaced with cash subadditivity in several cases (e.g., with lack of liquidity for the "riskless" asset). Starting from this, Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) proposed to replace convexity with quasi-convexity in order to better maintain the financial meaning of "diversification" originally connected with the subadditivity requirement. An interpretation of such generalisation in terms of financial prices, though, does not appear to be immediate, and is still under investigation.
terms of market efficiency. It turns out that the market is fully efficient, i.e., that no convenient super-hedging is possible, if all of the "shadow markets" are efficient, whereas absence of arbitrage is guaranteed by a local, less restrictive property.
Star-shaped prices are analysed in Section 3. We show that such functionals are the result of pricing by superhedging by means of assets whose average price is increasing, and show that such a requirement is actually a proper generalisation of the previous, convex case. We also introduce a new pricing technique, which we may call "super-hedging by chunks" and that mathematically corresponds to the inf-convolution of the price functionals of the "shadow markets". We show that convexity and star-shape are in some sense "stable" under super-hedging, either in the classical sense or in the "by chunks" one, and analyse the representation of star-shaped functionals in terms of market efficiency.
Finally, Section 4 is dedicated to summarising and comparing the main properties and the efficiency conditions of the four analysed market types and Section 5 features some concluding remarks.
Notation
A state space Ω is supposed to be given, and the market  is a set of (real valued) random variables 2 :
X Ω →  : every X ∈  is identified with an asset, in the sense that the (random) value attained by X corresponds to the pay-off (or the market value) of the considered asset at a suitable maturity. We are supposing that the uncertainty is resolved in a single time period: in other words, the models we encompass are of a static, not dynamic, type. We
) for every ω ∈ Ω , where ≥ indicates the usual weak inequality between real numbers. We shall suppose one of the classical "perfect market hypotheses" to hold, requiring every asset X ∈  to be infinitely available (there is no "maximum tradable amount") and divisible (it is possible to buy any fraction of it); furthermore, short sales are allowed. This translates into the fact that, for every a ∈  and every X ∈  , the investor can hold the position aX (where 0 a < indicates short sale of a units of X). Of course, several assets 1 2 , , , n X X X  can be simultaneously traded, by buying 1 2 , , , n a a a  units of each (with 0 j a < indicating short sale); this corresponds to holding a portfolio of those n assets, whose "final" pay-off plainly turns out to be 1 1 2 2 n n a X a X a X + + +  . Mathematically speaking, this corresponds to  being a linear space.
Giving a price to every traded asset X ∈  simply amounts to defining a (price) functional : π
The functional π is said to allow for:
• An arbitrage (see, e.g., Björk, 1999 and Pliska, 1997) if there exist a 0
(which means that it is possible to obtain an immediate gain, corresponding to the negative price, without any risk, i.e., with the certainty not to lose any money at the maturity);
• A convenient super-hedging (quite a recent concept: see, e.g., Castagnoli et al., 2009 and Castagnoli et al., 2011 , but also, for instance, Hodges & Neuberger (1989) , who observe the phenomenon although without specifically titling it) if there exist ,
(which means that it is possible to obtain a "higher" pay-off at a "lower" price).
Of course, the basic laws of supply and demand imply that neither of the above opportunities, which we shall jointly refer to as inefficiencies, should hold in a market: in both cases, the demand pressure on X would quickly lead its price ( ) Generally speaking, absence of arbitrages has the nature of a local property, because it only involves the behaviour of the price functional π with respect to the null pay-off, whereas absence of convenient super-hedgings is a global property, because it is required to hold for every pair , X Y ∈  . It is noteworthy as well that there are no general links between positivity and monotonicity. Take for instance,
is (of course) positive but not increasing (because, taken a 0 q < in n  , it is 2< and 2> ), whereas, taken a 0 p > in n  , the functional ( ) 1 y py π = − is increasing but 2 A puzzled reader, wondering about the measurability of such random variables, will find some clarifications in Remark 1 below.
Note also that, for every X ∈  , the price functional π induces a function
, which in a natural way can be called the supply and demand function for X. Remark 1. We purposefully decided to avoid measurability issues: in particular, we never mentioned the ( σ -)algebra  on Ω where the probability P is properly defined (and with respect to which all the X ∈  have to be measurable). This is only possible because of our choice of dealing with single period models: in order to introduce a dependence from time, actually, it is unavoidable to follow the well-known approach of defining a filtration ( ) t t∈  of ( σ -)algebrae contained in  and to suppose that, at every time t T ∈ , the value (price) of a random variable X ∈  is given by its conditional expected value ( )
| t E X  , possibly discounted in a suitable way.
In the same way, the price functional :
should be taken to be measurable with respect to the ( σ -)algebra  (and the Borel σ -algebra  on  ). As a matter of fact, the most general setting for this situation is to take an arbitrary (real) linear space  and to consider as possible price functionals all of the elements of a subspace ′  of the algebraic dual of  . Moreover, by considering on  the weak topology (i.e., the minimal one that makes continuous all of the ϕ ′ ∈  ), ′  turns out to be the topological dual of  , so that our setting can be included in the topological duality among linear spaces, a typical topic in Functional Analysis. Some more details can be found in Castagnoli et al. (in print) 
is allowed, possibly cancelling the immediate gain, but in some states a gain at the maturity will be obtained);
• As a matter of fact, when the assets X ∈  are not discrete random variables, the above definitions turn out to be impossible to deal with (they would imply, for instance, that for every ω ∈ Ω the "Dirac function" ω δ gets a positive price ( ) 0 ω π δ > , which is plainly meaningless). It is then customary to take into consideration an a-priori probability P on Ω , and to define X Y ≥ when X Y  and { } 0
In such a case, all of the "inequalities" between random variables are of course to be intended in the "P-almost everywhere" sense.
We decided not to take into consideration the weak arbitrages, both for the sake of simplicity and because we want to emphasize that there is no actual need for the a priori probability P to be given. It is nevertheless proper to cite this cases, both for compatibility with the existing literature and to remark that asking for weaker and weaker inefficiencies to be removed from the market translates into stronger and stronger regularity properties for the price functional π .
It is also noteworthy that, in order to define weak inefficiencies and to intend the inequalities "almost everywhere", instead of an a priori probability P, any a priori measure λ equivalent to P could be considered on Ω : it would actually be exactly the same to define X Y ≥ whenever X Y  and
e., when the set where X Y > has a positive measure instead of a positive probability. Briefly said, the normalisation property of the a priori measure is completely unnecessary.
Perfect Markets: The Linear Case
Besides the infinite availability and divisibility hypotheses cited above, the classical models based on "perfect markets" (see the already cited Björk, 1999 , Pliska, 1997 , and Dothan, 1990 ) ask for three more requirements.
First of all, all market agents are fully rational and they aim at maximising their profit; furthermore, all agents are equally informed, without "informational asymmetries". Secondly, the agents are price takers: they have no possibility to negotiate the prices they see on the markets. Finally, in the market there are no taxes, no bid-ask spreads, no commissions: in a word, there are no frictions.
All for every X ∈  and every a ∈  ). Note that this translates into the fact that the unit price for every asset X ∈  does not depend on the traded amount: buying (or short selling) a units of X exactly costs (or yields) a times the unit price of X. In other words, the supply and demand function X π is a linear function for every X ∈  : for every a ∈  ,
Every linear functional on a linear space attains null value at the "origin" (i.e., at the null vector): as an immediate consequence, an increasing linear functional turns out to be positive as well. Shortly said, for linear functionals, (increasing) monotonicity implies positivity. In the case of linear functionals, moreover, the converse is also true: X Y  is equivalent to 0 X Y −  , and the fact that ( ) ( ) ( )
immediately yields that a positive linear functional is increasing as well. In other words, positivity and monotonicity are equivalent in the linear setting: therefore, in the classical literature about perfect markets, convenient super-hedgings have never been specifically recognised as market inefficiencies, because a price functional allows for convenient super-hedgings if and only if it allows for arbitrages.
A classical duality result states that, given a linear space  of real valued functions defined on the same set Ω , a functional : π →   is linear if and only if there exist a (signed) measure µ on Ω such that ( ) ( )
Usually, it is said that π can be represented as the Lebesgue integral with respect to a suitable measure µ defined on Ω ; we remark that the measure µ may be "signed", i. ⋅ turns out to be a probability on Ω : this way, the above representation of the price functional becomes
which is classically told by stating that, if no arbitrages are allowed, the current prices of financial assets are the discounted expected values of their final random pay-off. In such a case, Q is called a risk-neutral probability (or, in the dynamical case, a martingale measure). Example 1. Take into consideration the state space
since Ω is finite, every random variable : X Ω →  can be identified with the vector
 : therefore, we shall simply write
. Suppose that two assets are exchanged on the market:
, at price 4, and 
Let us now represent the price functional π . As we already mentioned, for every 2 X ∈  it has to be ( )
, with a such that a X = X
. Suppose now that ϕ is a vector such that p It is immediate to realise that, since both components of ϕ are positive, the functional ϕ is (positive, and therefore) monotonically increasing. This shows that no arbitrages are allowed in the market. Note also that the discount factor is
, and that the vector 1 7 11 0.9 18 18
18
Just for the sake of completeness, suppose that the price of 
Proportional Frictions: The Sublinear Case
A natural generalisation of the linear model is to suppose that some frictions affect the market, in order to accommodate, for instance, taxes or commissions. By supposing such frictions to be proportional to the traded amount, it is possible to maintain "half" of the homogeneity property of the price functional: namely, π turns out to be positively homogeneous, meaning that ( ) ( )
for every X ∈  and every 0 a ≥ (no longer for every a ∈  ).
It is clear that such a price functional can no longer be expected to be additive: for instance, an agent buying both X and X − will pay the taxes and commissions on both of them, and thus will end up paying a positive price for the null pay-off: in symbols, ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
Nevertheless, since the agents are still supposed to be rational, it is reasonable to suppose that π is subadditive, i.e., that ( ) ( ) ( )
if the price of a joint position were greater than the sum of the two composing ones, every rational agent would separately buy the two components).
If X ∈  , generally speaking, the bid price induced by a pricing functional is ( ) ( )
. If π is (sublinear, and therefore) subadditive, recalling that ( ) ( ) 0
, where we write a π to underline that those expressed by π actually are ask prices. Roughly speaking, then, sublinear functionals model the case when the ask and the bid price may differ (due to taxes, commissions, or general bid-ask spreads), yet the unit price does not depend on the traded amount. The supply and demand function induced by a sublinear π for a given X ∈  takes the form
Every sublinear functional attains null value at the origin: therefore, every increasing sublinear functional is positive as well. The converse is not true, as already mentioned: the norm functional is positive, but not increasing. As a consequence, there may be sublinear price functionals that allow for convenient super-hedgings although not allowing for arbitrages. It is noteworthy, nevertheless, that π turns out to be increasing every time that it is "negative", i.e., when ( ) 0
Recalling that the bid price of the pay-off X is naturally defined as
in other words, absence of arbitrages is guaranteed by the positivity of ask prices of the positive pay-offs, whereas absence of convenient super-hedgings is ensured by the positivity of bid prices of the same positive pay-offs.
As an immediate consequence of the classical Hahn-Banach Theorem, a sublinear functional π can be represented as the pointwise maximum of the linear functionals that it "dominates". In greater detail: if π is a sublinear functional, then the set
is not empty and ( ) ( )
Moreover, if π is not allowed to take infinite values, L turns out to be convex and compact, so that the "sup "can be replaced by a "max". It is possible to show (see Pliska, 1997 and Castagnoli et al., 2009 ) that:
• π is positive if and only if there exists (at least) a positive L ϕ ∈ ; • π is increasing if and only if every L ϕ ∈ is positive. From a mathematical point of view, L is the subdifferential of π at 0 (see, e.g., Rockafellar, 1970) . According to such a characterisation, if π does not allow for convenient super-hedgings (and, therefore, not even for arbitrages), every L ϕ ∈ can be represented as the expected value with respect to a suitable measure Q ϕ , discounted by a suitable factor B ϕ :
In other words, an efficient sublinear functional acts "as if" a whole set L of "plausible" scenarios ϕ are involved, each corresponding to (a linear price functional, i.e., to) a probability measure Q ϕ and a discount factor B ϕ : the price assigned to every random variable amounts to the "worst case" discounted expected value, i.e., to the linear functional assigning the highest price to X. It is noteworthy to mention that such a representation was already conjectured by de Finetti & Obry (1933) .
One final consideration is in order. A rational investor who aims at obtaining the pay-off : Z Ω →  (which need not belong to  ) is naturally led to look for the best (super)hedge of Z, i.e., to buy the cheapest traded asset X ∈  that dominates Z (El Karoui & Quenez, 1995) . This way, (a better pay-off than) Z can be obtained at the price 
Roughly speaking, π  turns out to be the highest sublinear functional, among those dominated by π , that does not allow for (arbitrages or) convenient super-hedgings. 
Increasing Unit Prices
The Granular (Convex) Case
Although sublinear prices can indeed capture several features of prices in the "real world", they still feature unit prices which do not depend on the traded amount. Who trades on actual markets, instead, knows well that unit prices tend to increase with respect to the amount bought, and to decrease with respect to the amount sold. Suppose, for instance, that we are set to buy 1000 units of some asset. Having a look at the offer prices, we see that someone is selling up to 100 units at 3€ each, someone else up to 500 units at 3.1€ each, someone else up to 600 units at 3.2€ each, and so on. This way, we are facing increasing unit prices, and to buy all of the 1000 units we have to pay 3 100 3.1 500 3.2 400 3130€ × + × + × = : it is immediate to realise that, generally speaking, total price needed to buy 0 α > units of an asset turns out to be a(n increasing and) convex function of α (and piecewise affine, in our example, but this is not necessary: the price is a convex function of the traded amount every time that the marginal price is increasing, which is the standard hypothesis of the classical law of supply and demand). We want to show that a natural way to model such a situation is to take into consideration a convex price functional : π →   (which is of course a generalisation of the sublinear case, because every sublinear functional is convex as well): in order to do so, let us see how a convex price functional comes out in a very natural way.
Suppose that, in an exchange list under consideration, the assets (1), the convex functional π can be represented as
Note that ( )
implies that all of the constants f c are 0 ≤ , and that at least one of them is null,
Example 3. Take into consideration the same two assets of Examples 1 and 2, with pay-off matrix, 2 8 6 4
, and suppose that they are exchanged on the market as follows: Inside each region, the unit prices 
Note that this implies that the inequalities (3) hold for every X ∈  , not just for the listed assets. , , , n c c c
identifies a discount factor j B and a risk-neutral probability j Q , and therefore this model identifies at least nine risk-neutral measures; however, as already pointed out, the risk-neutral measures turn out not to be as important as the properties of the price functional in order to investigate market efficiency.
Note that, if both X and X H + belong to the same region As already mentioned, the price functional π is convex. We want nevertheless to strike out that, generally speaking, it is neither sub-nor superadditive: for instance, consider again the pay-off 800
. It is possible to check that 800
, and therefore 800 800 0 1012 1094 1200 0 1200
. On the other hand, it is also 400 495 600 π
, and therefore 800 400 400 1012 990 1200 600 600
. We want to point out that this second inequality does not correspond to a convenient super-hedging: indeed, it is not possible to buy simultaneously two portfolios yielding the claim 400 600
because, when doubling the position, the unit prices of the traded assets increase.
It is still possible to show that, if π does not take infinite values, the set consider the two assets:
, at the unit price of 4.5, which increases at 4.7 for purchases of more than 10 units; Table 1 It is possible to prove 7 that the "adjusted" functional π  , calculated after exploiting all of the convenient super-hedgings, is calculated as the maximum of six affine functionals as shown in Table 2 . Notably enough, the convex set Φ  identified by the six vectors 1 2a 4
, , , ϕ ϕ ϕ     exactly amounts to the subset of the positive vectors contained in the "original" set Φ (see Figure 2) . Note also that not all of the vectors j ϕ , 1, 2,3, 4 j = , induce risk neutral measures, because some of them have negative components; however, each of the six "vertices" of the "restricted" set Φ  can again be seen as the product of a risk neutral measure and a discount factor (for instance, 2b ϕ  corresponds to the degenerate probability tor 2b 0.925 B = ). Nevertheless, we remark that such elements are not as important as the ϕs themselves to investigate market efficiency.
When it comes to positivity, things get a little more complicated: indeed, the fact that Φ contains no positive functionals at all is still sufficient, but no longer necessary, in order to allow for arbitrages. Consider the following (and quite minimal) example. , which precisely indicates the possibility to get a free gain of 3 without risk. It is also worth pointing out that such an arbitrage is just "local" in the spirit of Castagnoli et al. (2011) , in the sense that there is an upper bound to the gains that can be obtained by means of arbitrages.
The point is that, as already mentioned, an arbitrage is nothing but a convenient super-hedging of the null vector. In the sublinear case, positive homogeneity ensures that such a convenient super-hedging (meaning both its positive pay-off and its negative price) can be multiplied by an arbitrary positive constant and still remain an arbitrage: this way, if arbitrages are possible, the region of the arbitrage portfolios is always unbounded. In the "granular" convex case, instead, positive homogeneity no longer holds, and therefore arbitrages may be confined to a bounded region, as it happens in Example 5.
As a matter of fact, it is possible to show that a linear functional ϕ ∈ Φ matters in determining whether π allows for arbitrages or not only if ϕ is relative to a "region" of the portfolio space that contains the null pay-off: we call 0 Φ such a subset of Φ 8 . In other terms, while Φ is the union of all subdifferentials of π , ( ) ( ) ) ( )
; it is furthermore possible to see that the two inequalities are equivalent to each other 9 . A possible reason why inequalities (3) are sensible in ordinary markets can be seen as follows. Take , α β ∈  such that 1 α β ≤ ≤ , so that 1 β α > . The first of the two inequalities (3) above is equivalent to
 in other words, the supply and demand function of an X ∈  satisfies (3) if and only if the average unit price of X is increasing with respect to the traded amount. This is why we deem reasonable such a property: indeed, when aiming at purchasing some quantity of something, it is rational to buy it at the lowest possible overall price, which of course coincides with the lowest average unit price.
Suppose, for instance, that three agents sell the same asset X on the market. The first one sells it at 4 per unit, but can only provide up to 30 units. The second one sells it at 5 per unit (for any amount). The third one sells it at 4.5 per unit, but only for a minimum order of 50 units. It is clear that the best price that can be obtained to buy .
As usual, such a functional immediately turns out to be increasing (and therefore positive, because ( )
moreover, it can be proved that π is star shaped as well, i.e., that inequalities (3) hold for every X ∈  . So to say, the star-shape of the single supply and demand functions "propagates" by super-hedging. An adaptation of a result by Chateauneuf & Aouani (2008) , still unpublished (see Castagnoli et al., 2009) 
It is indeed possible to prove that only the convex functionals g G ∈ such that ( ) 
To give an economical interpretation of such a representation, think that several agents are available to sell X on the market. Each agent, corresponding to a g G ∈ , assigns a convex price to X (i.e., has an increasing marginal price), and we are free to choose the agent we want to buy the asset X from (i.e., the cheapest one).
It is worth mentioning that the class of star-shaped functionals is closed under pointwise sup and inf, even for an infinite family of functionals; more explicitly, if  is any real linear space and ( ) Example 7. Take into consideration the same two assets of Examples 1, 2, and 3, with pay-off matrix 2 8 6 4
We suppose that the investor can call her/his demands on three different markets, each run by a (representative) agent with her/his own convex price system: this way, three convex price functionals 1 π , 2 π and 3 π are given. Suppose that the first one is the same of Example 2, with nine portfolio region as follows:
The second agents gives the granular price functional 2 π identified by 10 The third agent simply gives a linear price:
[ ] Let us take into consideration some random variables: the details of the calculations (which amount to see in which region the price of the given pay-offs is maximum) are left to the reader.
• For 1 300 300 • For 3 5000 1000 It is then clear that each of the three price systems has a chance to prove the cheapest one and, therefore, that it is effective in determining π as the pointwise minimum of 1 π , 2 π , and 3 π . This can happen even for a single asset: for instance, the three demand functions
in the three markets turn out to be: 
It is straightforward (but very laboured) to see that ( ) 
note that the marginal price is not increasing (for instance, around 
Since it is trivial that the minimum of a family of increasing functionals remains increasing, the above considerations allow us to conclude that a star-shaped functional does not allow for convenient super-hedgings if, and only if, it can be represented as the pointwise minimum of a family of increasing functionals. Note that this is quite analogous to what happened for convex and, before, for sublinear functionals: π allows for no convenient super-hedgings if, and only if, all of the functionals in the representation of π are increasing.
In order to deal with arbitrages, one more consideration is needed. Since, in the economical interpretation we gave, we are free to choose, among several agents, the best one to buy the pay-off X we want to detain, it is reasonable to think that we may prefer to buy several different portfolios from the different agents, in such a way that the overall position matches or, better, super-hedges X. Mathematically speaking, we are dealing with the following object: Definition 1. Let  be a real linear space, and
This way, if we are given a set { } 1. if every g G ∈ is convex, then F is convex; 2. if every g G ∈ is star-shaped, then F is star-shaped. The fact is that, even if every g G ∈ is such that ( )
Economically speaking, even if the "original" markets do not allow either for arbitrages nor for convenient super-hedgings, a "cross-market" arbitrage may still be possible. As a consequence, the inf-convolution π of 1 2 3 , , π π π will be star-shaped and increasing, because of Proposition 3, but such that
. (The inequality is indeed strict: for instance, 11 For every X ∈  , it is
therefore, by monotonicity of π , we get that ( )
chases, or for sales, or only some particular amounts can be bought (not just with a minimum or a maximum amount, as seen in the beginning of this section, but for instance for multiples of some "size" only), in such a way that the offer price function turns out not even to be star-shaped. Anyway, examining such cases goes beyond the scopes of the present paper.
Analysis
Four type of price systems, each a generalisation of the previous one, have been examined in this paper. From the last to the first, they are: 1. star-shaped prices:
, and furthermore) L is a singleton:
The mentioned fact that both the pointwise minimum and the inf-convolution of a family of star-shaped functionals still are star-shaped seems to suggest that no further generalisation of this type should be fruitful.
For each of the above types, the conditions for absence of arbitrages and of convenient super-hedgings can be examined by taking into consideration the behaviour of the price functionals on the indicator functions As for arbitrages, since π is not positively homogeneous, we need to take into consideration every all g G ∈ do not allow for them. As for convenient super-hedgings, it is now quite complex to summarise the properties that have to be imposed on the convex functionals g G ∈ in order to get an increasing functional (for instance, it is possible to prove that, for every x ∈  , ( ) π . It is clear that moving from linear to star-shaped price systems yields price systems whose properties are closer and closer to what happens in "real" financial markets. Yet, because of the fact that such systems are each the generalisation of the previous one, the "efficiency" conditions for each family of functionals propagates on the further generalisations in a reasonable way. All in all, therefore, these four price systems altogether make quite a versatile toolbox for building financial models, in the sense that, when a financial model is needed, it is easy to "fine tune" the level of precision to suit the needs of the considered problem.
Conclusion
A classical problem in Mathematical Finance is to study the prices of a suitable set of risky financial assets, modeled as random variables on some state sets, by means of suitable functionals defined on this set of random variables. The properties of the price functional reflect the assumptions on the market. In this paper, we analysed four types of price functionals. We first summarized the properties of the widely known linear functionals, obtained when the market was supposed to be perfect, and of sublinear functionals, which took into account the proportional frictions. Then, we introduced two more classes of functionals which accommodate a wider set of market frictions: granular (convex) functionals, obtained when the unit prices of traded assets were increasing 14 To conclude the short example: in computing w.r.t. the traded amount, and star-shaped functionals, obtained when the average unit prices of traded assets were increasing w.r.t. the traded amount. We explored some characterizations of such functionals, together with their relationships with arbitrages and market inefficiencies, and performed a final analysis on their effectiveness in allowing for versatile modelling.
